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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BULLFROG MARINA, INC.
Plaintiff and Appellant,
i
vs.
Im.BERT M. LENTZ,
Defendant and Respondent
and Cross Appellant.

R E S P 0 ND E N T 'S

)
)
)

Civil No.
12503

)

B R I E F

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
, This is an action in which Plaintiff-Appellant
I seeks damages for an alleged breach of a Houseooat Lease Agreement and amounts allegedly due
under an Employment contract.
1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Trial court entered judgment in favor of
Plaintiff-Appellant in the amount of $3703. 71.
The Trial court also denied Defendant-Respondent
recovery on his counterclaim.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPFAL
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks to reverse the
Judgment of the District court on determination
of no damages for breach of the Lease Agreement
for allowance of Attorney's fees and seeks
1dditional recovery under the Employment contract.
1

oef endant-Respondent seeks to have this court
ireduce the judgment of $5016. 51 by the sum of
pl55. 69, and affirm the decision of the Trial
court in all other respects.
1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff Bullfrog Marina, Inc., hereinafter called Bullfrog, in March of 1969 had a
"Concession contract" with the National Park
iervice of the Department of the Interior to
a houseboat rental service and other
concessions on Lake Powell based at Bullfrog
(Defendant's Exhibit# 2.) This contract
provided, among other things, that:
(a) If Bullfrog as concessionaire entered
into a sub-concession contract with someone else,
of the compensation received by Bullfrog
rould be due the National Park Service in addition
to the regular franchise fees payable to the Park
!ervice on gross receipts. (Paragraph 14 of
Defendant• s Exhibit # 2.)
I
(b) All contracts and agreements proposed
Ito be entered into by the concessionaire Bullfrog
respect to the exercise by others of any
granted under the concession contract
should first be subnitted to the National Park
lervice for approval. (Paragraph 14 Defendant 1 s
!Xhibit # 2.)
In March of 1969, the defendant, Mr. Gilbert
Lentz, met with Mr. Dumke, a representative of
Bullfrog, and explained that he had had previous
2

experience in operating a houseboat business.
!ttehad reservations lined up for the 1969 boat! ing season and was conducting a successful
i advertising campaign in Sunset Magazine by using

la trade-name which he had coined himself - "Aqua
! cruz."
1

Through their negotiations they contemplated uniting their efforts to achieve a 6

houseboat operation under which each party would
supply 3 boats.
Both parties were desirous of having their oraJ
agreements reduced to writing. Mindful, however,
of the concession contract provisions, the
determined that they did not want to
have Mr. Lentz deemed a subconcessionaire as
this would result in disastrous financial effects
as described in (a) above. To avoid this they
!decided to embody their oral agreements in two
documents so as to disguise what was in effect
a subconcession contract. (T-406) The first
document would be an employment contract under
which Mr. Lentz would manage the houseboat
division of Bullfrog. This would entitle him
in general to manage the operation by conducting
1

the advertising, sending out brochures, taking

[reservations, and directing the operations.
l.\nother of the crucial terms of the Employment
Contract was that which provided, ;'This agree-

I ment is subject to the approval of the Parks

1

Service of the Department of Interior."
The second agreement entered into by the
I>arties was a Lease arrangement whereby Mr.
would lease three houseboats to Bullfrog.
3

Lentz rented his houseboats with the agree111ent and understanding that he would operate
.them. The parties considered the lease agreeI11ent and employment contract to be parts of one
!transaction. (T-403) They went together and
!were treated and considered as one overall
agreement even though they were not signed on
the same day.
I

i

1

' The boating season on Lake Powell begins in
each year. Since it would have been mutually
advantageous and profitable for the parties to
take advantage of the tourist season, the parties
agreed that Mr. Lentz should begin work on May
19, 1969, even though the contracts would not
by Bullfrog's attorneys until some
time in the future.
Lentz continued to work throughout the sununer
on the basis of the oral agreements while waiting
for Bullfrog and its attorneys to reduce their
oral agreements to writing. Both contracts
were presented to Lentz for approval on several
and substantial hand interlineations
and exclusions were made. The employment contract
finally executed on or about July 31, 1969,
and Mr. Lentz recalls the date of the signing of
the lease agreement as October 10, 1969.
At the beginning of the operation the houseboat rental service was advertised under the
name of Aqua cruz with the Bullfrog Marina
address at Hanksville, Utah, and the advertising
in Sunset Magazine was continued under Mr. Lentz'
In October, 1969, Mr. Dumke
....., "Aqua Cruz."

1

4

, attempted to change this by eliminating the name
· "Auqa Cruz and wrote a letter to that effect
to sunset Magazine. (Defendant's Exhibit# 47.)
found himself in the precarious position
of having the advertising diverted away from him
md his control, combined with the elimination
of his trade name "Auqa Cruz.
In addition,
neither the lease agreement nor the employment
contract had been submitted to the Park Service
for approval as contemplated by the contracts.
11

11

submitting these agreements to the Park Service
for approval was part of the agreement between
the parties. They considered this as essential
as did the Park Service. Defendant's exhibits

#35 and# 36 are letters from the Park Service
to Bullfrog requesting that it submit to it the
lease agreement. The reason for the Park
Service's interest is set forth in Defendant's
exhibit # 35, which is a letter dated July 15,
1969, and which states, "This clearance is
necessary to ensure that there was not a
of you entering into a Subconcession
Contract.
'l'he above mentioned breaches were all taken
into consideration by Mr. Lentz and he gave
notice of termination of the lease and employment
contract on November 28, 1969. (Plaintiff's
EXhibit # 11.) Lentz then removed his boats from
Bullfrog Marina• s dock and moored them at Halls
11

1

I

Crossing Marina.
Once Bullfrog had received notice of termination by Mr. Lentz it decided to submit the lease
5

lgreement to the Park Service for approval. The
;record indicates this was done on or about
vecember 5, 1969. (Defendant's exhibit# 37.)
!It is significant that Bullfrog only sent a copy
io£ the lease agreement but did not send a copy of ,
I

the employment contract, even though this contract
!specifically states that it is subject to the
!approval of the National Park Service.
Later on in February of 1970, Bullfrog levied
trailers, claiming he was a non-resident. On
defendant's motion the attachment was dissolved
by the Trial court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

PIAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO COSTS INCURRED

IN THE ISSUANCE OF ATTACHMENTS

On February 18, 1970, Bullfrog levied attachon Mr. Lentz' houseboats located at Halls
Crossing Marina, alleging that Lentz was a nonresident of Utah. Soon after an additional
attachment was levied on Lentz' trailer located
at Bullfrog Marina.
The Trial court properly ruled that Lentz
was a resident of Utah at the time of the
/issuance of the attachments, and that_ since the
'attachments based on non-residency were improper
no costs would be awarded.

Residence for the purpose of the Attachment
statutes is largely based on intention. In 1
Shinn, Attachment & Garnishment, Sec. 90, it
is stated:

I

6

The question of residence, within the
meaning of the Attachment Law, is one
of intention, to be deduced from the
facts and circumstances of each case.
Language to the same effect is also found in
; 6 Am Jur 2d, sec. 223, Attachment and Garnishment, ·
at p. 721:
The question of residence in attachment
proceedings is generally one of intention
coupled with affirmative action and is
determined from the facts and circumstances in each particular case.
I

!

With reference to the intent of Mr. Lentz in
regards to his residency the record clearly
shows that he at all times subsequent to April,
1969,considered himself to be and intended to
re a resident of Utah. The court inquired of
as to his intention when he moved to Utah
and received the answer that he intended to
Utah his place of permanent residence.
(T-108)

It is also important to note the following
affirmative acts on the part of Lentz which
evidence his Utah residency:
1. Lentz moved from California to Utah in
early April, 1969, and lived at Lake
Powell continuously until November 23,
1969, with the exception of the time
he took off for vacation in the middle
of October. (T-59, 108)
2. Lentz' wife lived with him at Bullfrog
3.

Marina. (T-476)
Lentz did not spend all his time after
7

4.

5.

6.

7.

a.

9.

November 23, 1969, at his home in
Fillmore, California. During the
months of January, February, and
March of 1970, he traveled extensively
to boat shows which were in progress.
On one such occasion he met Mr. Dumke
in San Francisco. (T-70.)
Mr. Lentz owned a trailer which was
registered with the Utah state Tax
Commission in San Juan county. (T-61)
Lentz made several trips to Lake Powell
during the months of January, February,
and March of 1970, at any of which times
he could have been served with summons.
Lentz maintained a mailing address at
Bullfrog Marina in Hanksville, Utah,
and mail was received at the Post Off ice
for forwarding to that address. (T-73)
Lentz placed his trailer house at
Bullfrog on concrete blocks since he
intended to return and not remove the
trailer. (T-73)
Lentz attempted to register to vote in
Utah in 1969 and 1970 but was told that
no registration was possible until
August 4th. Lentz did not vote in
California during 1969 and did nbt
register in California during 1961.
(T-107)
Lentz was going to operate houseboats
and live at Lake Powell during 1970 as
evidenced by the negotiations he had
8

with Halls Crossing Marina in November
Of 1969. (T-58)
10. Lentz obtained a Utah driver's license
on March 30, 1970. (T-63)
The above are certainly indicative of the
I affirmative action taken by Lentz as evidence
of his Utah residency and his intent to remain
a resident.
I

The rule is stated in 6 Arn Jur 2d, Attaclunent
and Garnishment, sec. 225, at p. 722, that:
• • • one's place of business very
frequently has a decided influence
in determining the place and probable duration of his residence. One
conducting a business in a state
where he resides the greater part of
the time is not a non-resident within
the meaning of the attachment laws.
Lentz had been living in and conducting his
business in Utah from April, 1969, until the last
of November, 1969, a period of approximately
Smonths. He was certainly conducting a business
in Utah where he resided "the greater part of
the time." In the case of Krone v. cooper, 43
547 (1884), the court held the debtor had
a residence in the State where he conducted his
business the greater part of the time, even
I though his family lived in another state.
i
Note also that in the case of Mann v. Taylor,
I
43 N.w. 220, the court held that one who has a
temporary residence in the state for the
Prosecution of business therein, which may continue for an indefinite time, is not a noni
within the meaning of the attachment
I statutes.
I

I

•

9

, The Kansas Court in Garlinghouse v. Mulvane,
i40Kan. 429, 19 Pac. 798, said:
I
I

Where a residence is once established
it requires two conditions or things
to destroy it: First, a removal;
second, an intention not to return.
Applying this test to the instant case it is
apparent that the residence established by Lentz
during his 8 months at Lake Powell was not destroyed. It is true that Lentz left the area for
atime to visit his family and do some traveling
to various boat shows, but he always retained
the intention to return to Lake Powell and reside
there the greater part of the year. This is
borne out by the fact that Lentz had negotiations
with Halls crossing Marina in November of 1969
ln which he was to operate houseboats for them
during the 1970 boating season. (T-58)
At the time of the issuance of the Attachments
was a resident of the state of Utah and
had been ever since early April, 1969. When
the Attachments were issued Lentz was temporarily
out of state. He always had the intention to
return to his work at Lake Powell and during
the off-boating season he made frequent trips
to Lake Powell. And since the Attachments were
on nonresidency, plaintiff's costs in
levying the invalid Attachments cannot and should

not be assessed against the defendant.
II
BULLFROG WAS NOT ENTITLED TO POSSESSION
OF THE HOUSEBOATS FOR THE FULL TERM OF
THE LEASE OR FOR DA.i.'1AGES FOR CONVERSION
OF ITS POSSESSORY INTEREST
10

A.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE
TWO CONTRACTS WERE TO BE CONSTRUED AS ONE
AGREEMENT, AND THAT TERMINATION NOTICE
FURNISHED BY MR. LENTZ ON NOVF.M.BER 28,
1969, WAS NOTICE SUFFICIENT TO TERMINATE
BOTH CONTRACTS
!

I

The parties in their negotiations and in the
agreement they reached envisioned a six housebOat operation wherein three of the boats were
to be furnished by Mr. Lentz and three by
Bullfrog Marina. Lentz leased his houseboats
only with the agreement and understanding that
he would operate them. The lease and employment
contract were both part of one transaction and
went together and were treated and considered
ey the parties as one overall agreement even
though they were later signed individually.
(T-406)
The employment contract was not signed
until the latter part of July or the first part
of August. The lease agreement was not signed
by the parties until the end of the boating
season, around October 10, 1969.
The court's attention is called at this point
to those facts which indicate the parties intended
the two contracts to be construed as one agreement:
1. The parties originally wanted_ or contemplated one agreement in one document.
They decided, however, that in order
to avoid the disastrous financial
effects of Mr. Lentz being deemed a
subconcessionaire by the National Park
11

Service, they would prepare essentially
the same agreement but embody it in
two documents - one an employment contract and the other a lease agreement.
(T-402, 406)

2.
3.
4.

5.

6.

7.

The employment contract and lease agreement were between the same parties.
Both contracts were to have an initial
term of 2 years unless terminated earlier.
Both contracts concerned themselves with
the same subject matter, the operation
of house boats on Lake Powell.
Both contracts were negotiated and
prepared at the same time and
simultaneously submitted to Mr. Lentz
for his approval.
In July of 1969, Mr. Dumke flew both
contract at the same time to Lake Powell
to be reviewed by Mr. Lentz. Neither
were signed but both were modified and
flown back to Salt Lake City for retyping.
Both contracts were ultimately signed
within a relatively short time of each
other. The fact that they were signed
on different dates is due solely to
Bullfrog failing to have each retyped
and resubmitted to Lentz at the same
time. Previously the contracts had
always been presented together for
Lentz' approval. Since the contracts
were in the exclusive possession of
12

Bullfrog and its attorneys Lentz had no
control over the order and the time at
which they presented to him for signing.
(T-21)

In view of the above the Trial court correctly
ruled that the written lease and the employment
contract constituted one operational agreement,
were interdependent and interrelated, and
termination, breach, or cancellation of one
of the contracts constituted good and valid
reason for termination and cancellation of the
other. (Finding # 46} such a conclusion is,
of course, supported by numerous authorities,
the general rule being stated as follows in 17A
c.J.s., contracts, sec. 298, at p. 128:
• • • as a general rule • • • where
several instruments or writings are
made as part of one transaction, they
will be read, or construed, together,
and each will be construed with
reference to the other. This is true
even though the instruments involved do
not in terms refer to one another: so,
it may appear from extrinsic evidence
that they were executed as parts of
one transaction • • • in the absence
of anything to indicate an intention
to the contrary, instruments executed
at the same time, by the same parties,
for the same purpose or relating to
the same subject matter, and in the
course of the same transaction, are,
in the eyes of the law one instrument,
and will be read construed together
as though they were as much one in
form as they are in substance.
The above was clearly enunciated in Shepard
Y.:_John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. co., 189 Kan.
13

1.125, 368 P.2d 19, 26, (1962):
i

I
I

It is well settled that where two or
more instruments are executed by the
same parties contemporaneously or at
different times in the course of the
same transaction, and concern the
same subject matter, they will be
read and construed together so far as
determining the respective interests
of the parties, although they do not
in terms refer to each other.
And in Johnson v. Bennion, 70 Idaho 33, P.2d
148, 149 { 1949) , the Idaho Supreme court held
that an opt ion contract to purchase oil trucking
and a contemporaneous contract for
operation of the equipment were parts of the
same transaction. The court said:
• • • the law is clear that where
instruments are executed at the same
time, by the same parties and for the
same purpose, they are in effect the
same instrument and are read and construed together.
And this court, in Strike vs. White, 63 P.2d
600, 602 ( 1936) , said:

Another well-established rule of law is
that where two or more written instruments are executed as a part of one
transaction such instruments should,
when possible, be construed together.
It appears from the above that the two instruments need not ref er to one another nor need they
be simultaneously executed.
The question seems
to be one of determining (1) what constitutes
"one transaction", and ( 2) what constitutes the
"s"-e
..... 1
subject matter. "

In clark v. Levy,25 Ariz. 541, 220 P. 232,

14

I'

234 (1923), the Arizona Supreme court spoke of

: "one transaction":
The question as to whether several
instruments concerning the same subject matter should be construed as
constituting but one transaction is
always influenced by the surrounding
facts and circumstances and each case
is largely controlled by its own peculiar
. facts."

Hence, it is largely a question of fact whether
\ the lease and employment contracts were parts of
! the same transaction, and the record in this
I
case bears out the fact that the parties conI sidered them to be one document. See also Lynch
vs. Bank of America Nat. Trust & savings Ass'n,
2Cal App 2d 214, 37 P. 2d 716 (1934) wherein
the District court of Appeal held that two
documents were properly admitted as parts of
the same transaction.
In determining whether the instruments concern
the same subject matter, 17A C.J.S., contracts,
sec. 298 at p. 123 states as follows:
The general subject matter of the transaction may be identified by referring
to all of the instruments executed in
connection therewith, even though the
subject matter specifically described
in each instrument may differ."
It is also apparent that the general subject
involved in the instant case is houseboats.
employment contract provides for the operation
and management of the houseboats, while the lease
agreement provides for the source of the houseboats to be used in the operation. Both contracts
are concerned with houseboats - they differ only
as to the phase of the operation.
15

In Paramount Pictures Theatres corp. v.
' partmar Corp., 97 F. Supp. 552, 554, the court
held that two documents should be construed
together and stated:

-

It is evident the lease would not have
been entered into if the franchise
agreement had not also been entered
into at the same time, and conversely,
the franchise agreement would not have
been entered into unless the lease had
been entered into at the same time.
Although there were two separate documents - one the lease and the other
the franchise agreement - they were
executed at the same time, between
the same parties, for the same period
of time and, as a consequence, must be
considered as one agreement.
In the instant case it is obvious that Lentz
·would not have entered into the lease arrangement
without also entering into an employment agreement which would embody many of the same terms
contained in the lease, i.e., terms upon which
the contracts would take effect, duration,
grounds for cancellation. (T-413) Since both
contracts relate to the houseboats and one
contract would not have been entered into without the other, it can be assumed that the same
subject matter is involved.
In People v. Ganahl Lumber co., 75 P.2d 1067,
1070, (1938), the supreme court of California
construed two documents together, a lease and
a spur track agreement. The court said:
• • • we think that an examination of
the two instruments, the lease and the
spur track agreement, can leave little
doubt that they not only relate to the
16

same
?ut that the one is necessary
to explain tne other. In the first place
they are between the same parties, and
while dated at different times, they each
refer to and concern the same subjectmatter, to-wit, the occupancy and use of
the property of the lessor by the lessee.
The value of the lease would be greatly
impaired without the agreement and the
agreement for the spur track would be
utterly valueless to the respondent
without the agreement and the agreement
for the spur track would be utterly
valueless to the respondent without the
lease. Neither would in all probability
have been executed without the other.
Taken together, they contain the complete
agreement and understanding of the parties.
The two instruments were executed for
the purpose of achieving a single purpose.
"Where two or more written instruments
are executed contemporaneously, with
reference to each other, for the purpose
of attaining a preconceived object, they
must all be construed together and effect
given, if possible, to the purpose intended
to be accomplished." •••• in order to
ascertain the true intent of the parties
to said transaction respecting the term
for which the property was leased, it
was proper, and in fact necessary, to
consider both of said instruments, and
in arriving at said intent, said lease
and supr track agreement should be considered together as one instrument.
The statement of the California court could
be applied to the two contracts in the instant
case. They are between the same parties, each
refers to and concerns the same subject matter the operation of houseboats on Lake Powell, and
neither would have been executed without the
Other.
Since the employment contract and the lease
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agreement are treated in law as one agreement,
: the two contracts must stand together or fall
I
together. A breach of one would constitute a
])reach of the other since they are one and the
same. It was also the understanding of the
that they would exist together and terminate at the same time. (T-406) Hence, the
notice of termination given by Lentz to Bullfrog

Ion November
1

28, 1969, was sufficient notice to
f terminate both contracts.

B.
LENTZ WAS ENTITLED TO TERMINATE THE LEASE
AND EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT SINCE BULLFROG
MARINA BEGAN EXERCISING UNDUE CONTROL
OVER THE ADVERTISING AND RESERVATIONS
AND FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE CONTRACT
REQUIREMENT THAT BOTH CONTRACTS BE
SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
FOR APPROVAL!AND PATROL EVIDENCE IS
ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW THAT SUBMITTING BOTH
DOCUMENTS TO THE PARK SERVICE FOR APPROVAL
WAS PART OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
PARTIES.
The Trial court properly found that under the
tenns of the employment contract Lentz was to
supervise all the advertising for the houseboat
Bullfrog breached this provision in

1

: October and November of 1969 when it commenced
using Lentz' name "Aqua Cruz" in its advertising

I

and by withdrawing the advertising at Bullfrog

Marina from Lentz and doing its own advertising.
! Bullfrog further breached the contract by taking
reservations in its own name instead of having
1
made through Lentz. These breaches,
1 Combined with the fact that Bullfrog had
i

I
I
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. refused to subnit the contracts to the National
park Service for approval as the parties had
agreed upon, gave Lentz just cause to treat
any contractual relationship between them at an
end. Aproval of both agreements by the Park
service was a condition precedent to them being
binding upon plaintiff and defendant. Lentz
knew that they had not been submitted and also
he knew that Bullfrog had been requested several
i
i times by the Park Service to submit them in
I compliance with the master contract. (T-425;
Defendant's Exhibits 35 and 36) Lentz himself
: requested Bullfrog to submit them on several
occasions. Lentz was also in the position of
not knowing whether he could operate during the
, 1970 season since he did not know whether the
· two contracts would be approved by the Park
Service. There was a very strong likelihood
that the contracts would not have been approved
if they were both submitted together with a true
statement of the circumstances between the
parties. Since Bullfrog had appropriated the
advertising unto itself as wellas the trade-name
"Aqua Cruz" Lentz foresaw the great possibility
that he would have nothing if the Park Service
, did not approve the agreements. Bullfrog could
' then treat the agreements at an end and Lentz
would have no means of having a successful 1970
boating season. To be squeezed out of the
! advertising and the reservations and the
I
Possibility of no Park Service approval certainly
gave him apprehension and legal grounds to
I

1
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terminate. To hold that Lentz did not have the
right to terminate under these circumstances
place him at the mercy and discretion of
Bullfrog Marina which could, and we submit,
would have eliminated him from any effective
houseboat rental service in 1970.
That parol evidence is admissible to show
that the parties intended both contracts to be
subject to the approval of the Park Service is
well supported in law. The parol evidence rule
• in general terms requires, in the absence of a
showing of fraud, mistake, or accident, the
of parol or extrinsic evidence by which
: a party seeks to contradict, vary, add to or
subtract from the terms of a valid written
agreement or instrument. Nevertheless, there
certain recognized exceptions to this rule
are applicable here. It is stated at 30
I
i Am Jur. 2d, EVidence, sec. 1038 at p. 172:
It is now the general rule that parol
evidence is admissible to show conditions precedent which relate to the
delivery or the taking effect of a
written instrument. Such evidence does
not constitute an oral contradiction
or variation of the written instrument,
but goes to the very existence of the
contract and tends to show that no
valid and effective contract ever
existed, at least not until the fulfillment of the condition.
I

I

And in Nuttall v. Berntson, 30 P.2d 738, 740
(1934), the Utah supreme court said:
It is well settled in this state that
an oral agreement made prior to.or
contemporaneous with the execution of
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a written contract that such written
instrument is delivered on the express
agreement that it shall not become
effective except on the happening of
a certain contingency, and that the
contingency has not happened to give
effect to the written contract, may
be shown in defense in an action on
the written contract.

It certainly is no longer an open question
in this jurisdiction, if it is anywhere,
that where a written instrument, regardless of its nature or conditions, is
delivered upon the express agreement or
understanding by the parties that the
instrument shall not become effective
except upon the happening of a certain
event or not until some act or condition
shall have been performed, the instrument
does not become effective until the
happening of the event or performance
of the act or condition.
From the above it is clear that it would be
proper to admit parol evidence as to a condition
precedent to the taking effect of the lease
agreement and the employment contract.
Parol evidence of the substance of the negoti iations leading up to the signing of the documents is also admissible where the
is
I
I Silent on the particular matter, as well as
'. Where the contract is ambiguous or uncertain.
In 32A c.J .s., Evidence, sec. 930, the following
1

[is material:
·
In general, the parol evidence rule
does not exclude evidence which does
not tend to vary or contradict the
written instrument ••• Thus parol
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evidence which does not vary or
contradict the document under
consideration is admissible to
establish the ccnnection of the
document with the case; to show
matters as to which the instrument
is silent.
In the case of Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d
389, 360 P.2d 176, 177 (1961), the Utah Supreme
'court held that it was proper for the trial court
to admit parol evidence on a matter as to which
the contract was silent. The plaintiff had
contracted to exchange a jeep and house trailer
for some uranium stock. A contract which was
up was silent, however, as to who was to
deliver the stock· - the defendant or the defendant's investment company. The court said:
• • • it was proper and necessary for
the court to consider extraneous
evidence as to how the parties intended
this to be done.

!

And in Souder v. Tri-county Refrigeration co.,
l90 Kan. 207, 373 P.2d 155 (1962), the Kansas
Court said: at p. 159:
There is a wide distinction between an
an attempt to contradict the terms of
a written instrument and to explain
the circumstances and conditions under
which it was executed and delivered.
It has regularly been held that where
a contract is incomplete or silent in
any particular, parol evidence is
admissible to show the actual agreement
between the parties, and this is not
limited to cases where there is
ambiguity.
Another well-settled exception to the parol
evidence rule exists where there is a "partial
22

·integration", i.e., where the entire agreement
: nas not been reduced to writing. The doctrine
states, in Am Jur 2d, Evidence, sec. 1043
at p. 177 as follows:
I

• • • parol evidence not j.nconsistent
with the writing is admissible to show
what the entire contract really was,
by supplementing, as distinguished
from contradicting, the writing. In
such a case parol evidence to prove
the part not reduced to writing is
admissible, although it is not admissable as to the part reduced to writing.
The admission in such cases of parol
evidence which is not inconsistent
with the writing does not violate the
parol evidence rule, because the
evidence received, instead of contradicting or varying the written instrument,
is clearly in support of furtherance of
it.
The annotator in 70 ALR at p. 770 discusses
the rule of integration as follows:
• • • where the writing is complete on
its face, parol or extrinsic evidence
is admissible to prove an alleged
agreement as to a matter on which the
writing is silent - not to add to the
terms of the written agreement, but
to prove a separate and distinct agreement, though perhaps relating to the
same subject matter: (5) the test as
to whether the alleged parol agreement
is sufficiently distinct and separate
so that the parol-evidence rule does
not preclude its proof is primarily.
whether the parties intended the written
contract to cover all of the matters
embraced in their prior or contemporaneous
negotiations, including that part omitted
from the writing • • •
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c.
THE PARTIES DID NOT WAIVE THE CONTRACT
PROVISIONS THAT BOTH CONTRACTS BE SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE FOR

APPROVAL

It was the understanding and agreement of the
that the employment contract and lease
agreement should be submitted to the National
Park Service for approval. In fact, it was a
requirement in the master contract between
Bullfrog Marina and the National Park Service
that all contracts entered into by the concessionaire (Bullfrog Marina) should be submitted to
the Park Service for approval if they were at
all related to the exercise by others of any
,Privileges granted under the concession contract.
(Defendant• s Exhibit # 2, paragraph 14.)
The District court properly held that the
did not waive the above mentioned condition precedent. (Finding # 48) Lentz considered
the condition precedent at all times to be in
force and ef feet and necessary to the validity
of the contracts. Prior to termination Lentz on
numerous occasions urged Bullfrog to comply with
I the condition precedent by submitting the
contracts to the Park service. When this provision
in the contract was not timely compli-ed with
terminated the contracts, realizing they
would not be enforceable by him if not approved
by the Park service and that he could very easily
be out of the houseboat business the next surmner.
1

At no time did Lentz expressly or impliedly
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nianifest any intention to acquiesce in a relinquislunent of the condition precedent.
'l'he submitting of the lease agreement to the
park Service was eventually complied with by
Bullfrog, (D-37) thus confirming Bullfrog's
intention of treating the condition precedent
as still in force. Bullfrog had never abandoned
this provision of the contract. The fact that
it submitted the contract to the Park Service
for approval is clear and convincing evidence
that it still considered this condition precedent
to be a vital element of the contract. Even if
it could be shown that Bullfrog had waived the
condition precedent, the condition would still
be in force as one party cannot waive for the
other party a provision which is designed to
apply to both parties.
In 17A c.J.S., contracts, sec. 492, p. 691,
it is stated:
A waiver may be express or it may be
implied from acts or conduct, but to
constitute a waiver an intentional
relinquishment of a known right is
essential.
And at p. 693 of the same section:

However, all the attendant facts, taken
together, must amount to an inteptional
relinquishment of a known right, in
order that a waiver may exist, and
various acts or conduct viewed in the
light of all the facts and circumstances
have been held not to constitute a
waiver.
Taking all the attendant facts, not just the
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fact that Lentz began work before the contract
was approved, but considering also the above
mentioned facts that Lentz repeatedly wrote
letters urging plaintiff to submit the contract
for approval, that in reliance on the condition
Lentz terminated, that the plaintiff
wentually complied with the provision by submitting the lease to the Park Service, the
conclusion is inescapable that, in view of all
the attendant facts, the parties did not waive
nor did they intend to waive, the provision in
the contract calling for Park service approval.
A case directly in point with the above
conclusion is Bonunarito v. Souther canning co.,
208 F. 2d 56 ( 19 53) , where in the u. s. court of
Appeals (8th Circuit) held that in light of
all the circumstances a condition precedent was
·not waived. The plaintiff was a dog food ma.nu• facturing corporation that brought an action
in replevin against an individual whose mother
. and father owned the building where the defendant
. son manufactured the corporation• s dog food with
.I the corporation• s machinery. A space was left
blank in the contract for the son' s pa.rents to
1

i sign, stating that the defendant had their

authority to lease the building, and a provision
exculpating them from any liability for perforof the terms of the contract. The defendant and plaintiff signed and then forwarded
the contract to defendant's parents for their
Signatures. The parents refused to sign and
returned it to the defendant. The court con26

eluded that the space for the parent's signatures
and the accompanying clause amounted to a condition precedent and said:
• • • the court could and did properly
find that.the provision requiring the
parents' signatures was intended to be
an essential part of the agreement and,
absent their signatures, no contract
ever existed
Defendant argues that if the signatures of the parents was a condition
of the contract, this condition was
waived by performance under the contract. The evidence shows that defendant manufactured dog food for plaintiff
from May until August, 1951, in accordance with the terms contained in the
written agreement. Defendant contends
that the plaintiff cannot now claim the
contract never became binding because
of the absence of their signatures.
But the conditions under which the
parties were operating clearly show that
a waiver of the condition was not intended
or affected. Plaintiff had moved its
equipment into the plant under an oral
agreement with defendant's father.
Defendant's father manufactured dog
food for plaintiff for several months
but steadfastly refused to sign a
written contract. When defendant took
over his father's business, plaintiff
renewed its efforts to get a written
contract. Because it was mutually
profitable, it was natural and reasonable that production should continue
during this period. When it became
apparent, however, that defendant's
parents were not going to sign the
agreement, plaintiff withdrew and sought
to recover possession of its equipment.
The trial court properly held, under the
circumstances, that there was no waiver
of the condition that the parents as.
owners of the real property should sign
the agreement for its use.
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---

In applying the holding of Bommarito to the
facts in the instant case it is apparent that
a waiver of the condition precedent was not
effected. Employment was begun in both cases
before any contract was signed because it was
advantageous under the circumstances
for each party to proceed before the contracts
were signed by the third
since they
had to be prepared by Bullfrog• s attorneys.
Yet this was not conclusive proof of waiver of
the condition precedent as the court pointed
out. One party in each case kept insisting that
the other meet the requirements of the condition
precedent. Furthermore, had the parties in the
instant case intended to Wiive the condition
precedent they could have eliminated the condition
by lining it out when they finally signed the
contract on or about October 10, 1969. The
fact that they left this provision in the contract clearly demonstrates that they did not
waive this requirement, and that it was an
integral part of the agreement and a condition
to being a valid existing contract for
the two year period mentioned in the contract.
In Marso v. Mankato Clinic, 153 NW 2d 281,
290 ( 1967), the supreme court of
said the lower court correctly charged the
·Jury on the subject of waiver as follows:
•
• to establish waiver, it must be
that the party charged therewith
knew of his legal right and intended
to relinquish or give it up. The
to waive, which involves an operation
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of the mind, must be clearly established
as a fact. To establish such intent
relevant actions and statements of the
individuals concerned may be considered
as having a direct bearing thereon.
The actions of the parties in the instant case,
as well as their written statements, prove that
such intent never existed.
See also Cary v. Brown, 196 so. 579 (La. 1940):
Steigerwald v. Godwin, 144 c.A.2d 591, 301 P.2d
386, 389 (Cal. 1956).
By way of summary, a condition precedent can
oo waived by the parties if their conduct amounts
to an indication of their intention to disregard
the prov is ion. However, all of the attendant
facts must be considered in the determination of
whether a waiver is to be implied. The facts in
I the instant case dispel any notion of an intentional waiver of the provision calling for Park
!

I
1

Service approval.

. POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY COMPUTED THE
AMOUNT OF CONSIDERATION DUE BULLFROG
UNDER THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT'S INCENTIVE
COMMISSION PROVISION.
Under the terms of the employment contract
was to receive 800/o of the net income as
an incentive commission. At trial Bullfrog
Produced testimony to the effect that the
incentive commission was a cost which should be
deducted from gross income in order to arrive at
net income to which the 80% should be applied.
,Bullfrog's accountant used a so-called trial
and error method in making his computation of
29

the incentive commission since Bullfrog's construction of the incentive commission provision
would require the use of two unknown amounts,
net income and incentive commission, which are
dependent upon each other.
The Trial court refused to adopt the accountmg method proposed by the plaintiff and
applied the method supplied by Lentz' accountant.
accountant did not include the incentive
. commission as a cost deduction from the income
of the houseboat operation. He correctly
determined that after all direct costs were
deducted Lentz was entitled to 80"/o of the net
income as an incentive commission.
Bullfrog's trial and error method, which was
rejected by the court, involves the operation
of two unknown variables in order to arrive at
the amount of the incentive commission to which
wntz was entitled. Defendant respectfully
subnits that such a cumbersome and complicated
method of arriving at the incentive commission
not within the contemplation of the parties
at the time they contracted. The record shows
the court found that net prof it had been
divided on the bas is of 80% to defendant and 20"/o
to plaintiff each month during the 1969 boating
season without first deducting the incentive
corranission, and both parties had accepted this
method of accounting.
The court's attention is also called to the
fact that there was no evidence that the parties
ever discussed, understood or agreed upon Bull30

frog's accountant's method of substracting the
incentive commission (Derived at by a so-called
trial and error method) from the gross prof its
to arrive at the net profit.
At trial Lentz' accountant testified that the
trial and error method used by Bullfrog's accountmt was not applicable in this particular situation. (T-512) Several accounting textbooks were
referred to and both applied the trial and error
method only when federal tax problems were
involved. (T-507, 509)
Furthermore, defendant respectfully submits
that Bullfrog never heard of their accountant's
rethod of subtracting the incentive commission
·from gross income until a few weeks before
their account appeared on the witness stand.
Certainly Lentz and Bullfrog had never heard of
this method before.
On page 32 of Plaintiff's Brief, Plaintiff
lists 4 receipts from rentals which were not
included in the accounting of Bullfrog's
accountant and claims the judgment should be
increased by a percentage of that amount.
It should be noted, however, that the Trial
Court rejected Bullfrog's accounting and
i accepted that of Mr. Lentz' accountant, Mr·
· Reeves, CPA. Mr. Reeves ' accounting did take
these amounts set forth by Bullfrog into con• Sideration and they are included in his computation on page 2 of Defendant's Exhibit # 52,
!

lines 6 and 7.

These amounts were in controversy
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and the Trial court considered the evidence
and found they had been correctly accounted for
in the accounting presented by Mr. Lentz•
accountant. No additional recovery for these
amounts should be awarded, then,since they are
included in the accounting accepted by the Trial
court.
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S CROSS APPFAL
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT
THE $3155.69 REMAINING IN THE HOUSEBOAT
CHECKING ACCOUNT AT THE END OF OCTOBER,
1969, AND WHICH WAS TURNED OVER TO BULLFROG,
WAS NOT TO BE CHARGED AGAINST BULLFROG IN
THE ACCOUNTING BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND
DEFENDANT.

During the month of June, 1969, a special
checking account was opened by the parties with
First Security Bank into which monies from houseboat rentals would be deposited. This checking
account required the signature of Mr. Lentz and
one of the signatures of 3 of the officers of
Bullfrog. checks were drawn on this account to
pay expenses of operation and to Mr. Lentz and
to Bullfrog from time to time to reimburse them
for expenses they had incurred in the houseboat
operation and to pay them their percentage share
of the net prof its. At the end of October,
1969, after the boating season was over, the
amount remaining in the checking account was
$3155. 69. ( T-498) • Bullfrog then kept control
Of this account and the $3155.69 was turned
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over to Bullfrog.
'!'he gross income from the houseboat operation
was to be distributed between the parties on the
basis of 20% net income to Bullfrog and 8C>°fe net
income to Mr. Lentz. In addition, each party
would be reimbursed for his expenses. On this
basis Bullfrog was entitled to receive the sum
of $13,567.26. (Defendant's Exhibit# 52, p.
3, line 24.) Plaintiff's Exhibit# 8 and
Defendant's Exhibit# 12 set forth the income
and expenses of the houseboat operations. To
date, Bullfrog has received $13,019.24 (Defendant's Exhibit# 52, p. 3, line 39.), and this
includes the amount in controversy, $3,155.69.
Mr. Lentz is therefore indebted to Bullfrog in
the amount of only $582.02. (Defendant's
Exhibit # 52, p. 3, line 41.)
The Trial court erred in determining that the
$3,155.69 should not be charged against the
amount Bullfrog has received. The plain uncontroverted facts are that the $3,155.69 came
from the rental of houseboats (T-498) and was
deposited in the houseboat checking account and
constituted a part of the gross income. Any
monies which were due Bullfrog or Lentz from
, the houseboat operation had in the past been
drawn from this checking account and'had been
included as a part of the amount each had
received. Therefore, any amounts which were
drawn on this account or left in the account
Should be charged against the party who
received it.
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rtie $3,155.69 was turned over to Bullfrog by
virtue of Bullfrog taking possession of the
account by removing Lentz' name as one of the
authorized signators. Whether Bullfrog came
into receipt of the amount in controversy by
a check drawn on the account or through gaining
exclusive control of the account and taking it
over is actually immaterial. The crucial fact
is that Bullfrog did receive the $3,155.69 from
the houseboat account and it should be charged
against Bullfrog in the accounting.
CONCLUSION
The Trial court did not err in refusing to
award the Plaintiff any costs which it incurred
in the issuance of attachments based on the
alleged non-residency of the defendant, Lentz.
The evidence shows that Lentz was a resident of
the State of Utah at the time the attachments
were issued. 11 Intent 11 has been held to be the
major factor in determining residency and the
court found from the evidence that defendant
intended to become and remain a resident of
Utah at the time he entered the state in April
I of 1969. Further, the evidence shows and the
Court found from all the facts and
in evidence that Plaintiff did not sustain its
burden of proving the Defendant's non-residency.
Note that Lentz had worked in Utah the greater
part of the year 1n 1969 and the record shows
he intended to live and maintain his residence
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in Utah indefinitely from that time on.
The Trial court properly and correctly ruled
that the Plaintiff was not entitled to possession
of the houseboats for the full term of the Lease
since Bullfrog breached the contracts, thereby
i giving
Lentz grounds to terminate the same.
· Bullfrog breached contracts by exercising undue
control over the advertising and reservations and
· by failing to timely submit the contracts to the
· Park Service for approval. The Trial court
: also correctly construed the contracts as one
contract and therefore mutually dependent on and
interrelated to each other. If one contract
failed they both failed and termination of one
' constituted termination of the other.
Parol evidence of the substance of the negotiations leading up to the signing of the contracts and the oral agreements which they arrived
at before the contracts were signed was admissible
and properly admitted by the Trial court since
such evidence is admissible to explain areas in
which the contracts are silent and to show any
conditions precedent to the effectivemess of the
contracts.
The parties by their actions also refuted
any suggestion that they intended to 'le,ive the
Provision of the contracts requiring Park
Service approval. Their conduct shows that
they considered the conditions precedent to
I be Vital elements of the contracts and that they
I

i did not intend to waive those provisions.
I
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The District court also correctly ruled that
, the accounting supplied by defendant's accountant was the proper method for computing incentive
commission and that the method proposed by
plaintiff's accountant was inapplicable to this
, particular situation. The record shows that the
parties never agreed to or contemplated the
method of figuring the commission as proposed by
Plaintiff. Further, Defendant suggests and
respectfully submits that the Plaintiff had never
heard of the trial and error method of figuring
incentive commission until its accountant suggeste
the method just prior to trial. It is also worth
noting that the accounting method suggested by
defendant and accepted by the Trial court is the
method under which the parties had operated
during the entire boating season of 1969, and
both had accepted that method until the plaintiff's accountant suggested the method of trial
and error.
The Trial court erred in not charging Bullfrog
with the receipt of $3,155.69 which was turned
over to Bullfrog out of the houseboat checking
account. This amount should have been included
as one of the payments which went toward making
up the $13, 567. 26 to which Bullfrog was
1

I entitled.
I
I

I

Respectfully submitted,
DUANE A. FRANDSEN
of the firm of Frandsen
and Keller
Professional Building
Price, Utah
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